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Abstract
In this paper we construct a model of a \risky bank." The bank
faces excess demand in the loan market, can sort loan applicants by
an observable measure of quality, and faces a small but positive prob-
ability of default on its loan portfolio. The bank uses two policies to
allocate credit:
² Tighten restrictions on loan quality
² Limit the number of loans of a given quality
We show that the level of default risk and other structural condi-
tions have important e®ects on the market for loanable funds and
the bank's optimal policies (loan rates, deposit rates, and lending
standards). The structural conditions that we examine are monitor-
ing costs, returns on alternative investments, ¯rms' minimum funding
requirements, and the level of the reserve requirement. The model
provides insight into several stylized facts observed in loan markets,
especially in developing countries.
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1 Introduction
Banks are the dominant ¯nancial institution for channelling funds from savers
to entrepreneurs in most \emerging ¯nancial markets." Many countries,
especially developing economies, report the following problems (cf., Beim
and Calomiris (2000)):
² Costly banking crises
² Large spreads between deposit and loan rates
² Reports of \credit crunches" (i.e., excess demand) in loan markets
We construct a model of a \risky bank" that can account for these stylized
facts. The bank arises endogenously to accept deposits from investors and
make loans to entrepreneurs with risky projects that can be sorted by an
observable measure of project quality. The bank faces a small but positive
probability of default. This friction in the bank's loan portfolio causes depos-
itors to consider the risky bank's pro¯tability. Speci¯cally, depositors require
a risky bank to be more pro¯table than a riskless bank because they must be
compensated for the expected cost of recovering funds when default occurs.
We analyze the problem of a bank that chooses a deposit rate, loan rate,
and a minimum loan quality standard when there is excess demand for loans.
The bank must satisfy a reserve requirement, but there is no deposit insur-
ance. The bank manages the excess demand by rationing loans in two ways.
First, because the bank chooses the quality of its loan portfolio, the bank
can tighten the minimum quality requirement for loan applicants.1 Second,
the bank can restrict the quantity of loans it grants to borrowers of a given
quality level. Rationing by loan quantity was proposed by Williamson (1986)
for banks that are not subject to default risk. To our knowledge, rationing
by loan quality has not been studied previously in equilibrium models,2 yet
an important role of banks is to screen loan applicants based on measures
of project quality. We assume that the quality of individual applicants is
observable by the bank, and focus on the implication of loan portfolio risk
for loan rates, deposit rates, and lending standards.
1For example, quality can be measured by a parameter that indexes a mean preserving
change in the variance of the distribution of a bank's portfolio of loan returns.
2There is a literature on loan portfolio diversi¯cation, but it is aimed at operational
ways to measure and control a bank's credit risk exposure. Our focus is on the implications
of a given level of default risk for the macroeconomic problems enumerated at the outset.
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When banks are risky, the level of default risk and other structural condi-
tions have important e®ects on the market for loanable funds and the bank's
equilibrium decisions. We show how this default risk is \priced out," and
that the default premium can a®ect the deposit rate, the loan rate, and the
quality cuto®. We characterize four distinct equilibrium outcomes:
(i) Rationing by loan quality: The default premium is borne entirely by the
loan rate. Neither the extent of credit rationing nor the deposit rate
change. The change in the interest rate spread is larger than the change
in the default premium, a type of multiplier e®ect.
(ii) Rationing by loan quantity: When the bank's expected return for a given
quality level is insu±cient to compensate depositors, increases in the
default premium increase rationing by loan quantity and decrease the
deposit rate. The decrease in the deposit rate causes dis-intermediation.
(iii) Both types of rationing can occur if the default risk is su±ciently high.
(iv) No banking equilibrium: This case corresponds to the costly banking
crises observed worldwide.3
2 The Model
Consider a model with two types of risk neutral agents, ® lenders and 1¡ ®
entrepreneurs. There is an initial planning period, and a subsequent con-
sumption/production period. Each entrepreneur is endowed with a project
with a random return yi but no input. Hence entrepreneurs wish to borrow.
Each lender is endowed with one unit of input but no project. All projects
have a common scale q > 1. Agents are asymmetrically informed. Borrowers
privately and costlessly observe their return, but lenders do not unless a state
veri¯cation cost is paid. If a lender chooses to incur cost cb > 0 to verify a
project return, this cost is paid in output to an exogenous veri¯cation au-
thority. Deadweight loss cb \disappears" from the economy. The true project
realization yi is privately revealed only to the lender who pays the cost.
3The IMF estimates that the cummulative output loss due to banking crises as a
percentage of GDP is 10.2 % among industrial countries and 12.1 % among developing
countries (cf., IMF (1998), Table 15, p. 79). Our results suggest that di®erences in the
default premium and structural di®erences may account for some of this.
3
Williamson (1987) established that in this costly state veri¯cation model a
bank emerges endogenously from among the set of investors. The bank writes
deposit contracts with investors and loan contracts with entrepreneurs. In
this standard setting individual project returns are identically and indepen-
dently distributed with a common distribution function G(yi). We add two
features that a®ect the distribution of average returns from the bank's loan
portfolio G(y; µ; s). First, we introduce two states, s = l; h; the bank defaults
in the low state and is solvent in the high state. Second, we introduce an
index µ that measures quality of a project.
Assume that G(y; µ; s) is de¯ned over the range of possible returns (0; ¹y)
and has density function g(y; µ; s).
² As µ changes, Gµ(y; µ) ¸ 0 for all y and Gµ(y; µ; s) > 0 for some y.4
E.g., this captures the situation of a bank that faces a distribution
of entrepreneur projects with returns that have the same mean but
di®erent variances. Quality parameter µ has a distribution H(µ) over
a range [µmin; µmax] with density h(µ).
² States s = l; h a®ect distribution G(y; µ; s) in the sense of Second Order
Stochastic Dominance: Gl(y; µ; s) ¸ Gh(y; µ; s) > 0 for all y.
Assume that µ and s are independent. Let ¹s denote no default risk and ps be
the probability of state s. Assume that s does not a®ect the expected return
pl
¹yZ
0
ydG(y; µ; s = l) + ph
¹yZ
0
ydG(y; µ; s = h) =
¹yZ
0
ydG(y; µ; ¹s) = ~y
Lenders, who have an endowment of input but no project, inelastically
supply labor when young to earn wage w > 0, and have access to two in-
vestment opportunities. First, they may lend to entrepreneurs under terms
governed by a contract. Second, they may invest in an outside option that
yields xi > 0 for each unit invested. Return x is costlessly observable and
does not require veri¯cation.5 Prior to its realization, x is uncertain and
4As µ increases the distribution is more risky in the sense of Second Order Stochastic
Dominance. When agents are risk neutral, a mean-variance selection rule is appropriate
for a normal distribution of returns, cf., Bawa (1975). We show that an increase in the
variance of the distribution of loan returns decreases the \quality" of loan applicants,
decreasing the bank's expected return.
5This introduces an upward sloping supply curve for saving deposits. The outside
option can be motivated as a government bond with a publicly known return. In contrast,
the returns on private projects are costly to verify.
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has a distribution I(x), with i(x) = I 0(x) > 0 and x²[0; ¹x], where ¹x is the
maximum return on the outside opportunity.
Finally, information is crucial in the economy. We assume that
² Ex-ante agents know G(y; µ; s), I(x), H(µ), µ, pl
² Ex-post entrepreneurs privately observe return yi, and investors do not
unless costly veri¯cation occurs. Return x is costlessly observed by all.
2.1 Distribution of the Bank's Loan Portfolio
We now derive the relationship among y, µ, s, and the probability of default,
pl. We begin by distinguishing between the bank's income from an individual
borrower and the average income from its loan portfolio. The bank's income
from entrepreneur i = 1; : : : ;m is
Li(xi) = Li(G(yi; µi; s))
Average income per borrower from the loan portfolio under contract L(:) is
1
m
mX
i=1
Li(G(yi; µi; s)) ! E[L(G(y; µ; s)js)]
Then G(¢) is the distribution of returns from loan portfolio L(G(y; µ; s)js).
Assume that G(¢) takes two values given by
² Gl(¢): The distribution of returns from the loan portfolio if s = l
² Gh(¢): The distribution of returns from the loan portfolio if s = h
Krasa and Villamil (1992, p. 203) shows that the probability of bank failure,
pl, converges to the probability that the return from the bank's asset portfolio
is less than return that the bank must pay the depositors, face value ¹D
P (f 1
m
mX
i=1
Li(G(yi; µi; s)) < ¹Dg) ! P (fE[L(G(y; µ; s)js)] < ¹Dg)
We assume that the bank defaults in the low state, with pl > 0 but small
P (f 1
m
mX
i=1
Li(G(yi; µi; s = l)) < ¹Dg) = pl
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2.2 Riskless Banking
When the bank faces no default risk, Williamson (1986) showed that (i) the
optimal contract is simple debt, (ii) banks arise endogenously to eliminate
duplicative monitoring, and (iii) equilibrium credit rationing by loan quantity
may arise. We brie°y review these results in the Appendix since they provide
a benchmark to which the bank's problem with default risk is compared. The
Appendix shows that when the bank faces no default risk, i.e., s = ¹s, the
expected return function for a bank that contracts with an in¯nite number
of entrepreneurs is
¦(L(y; µ); µ; ¹s) =
Z
Bb
(L(y; µ)¡ cb
q
)dG(y; µ; ¹s) +
Z
B0b
¹LdG(y; µ; ¹s) (1)
The ¯rst term on the right hand side is the bank's expected return from loan
contract L(y; µ), net of per project monitoring costs, cb
q
, in default states
y 2 Bb. The second term is the bank's expected return when loans are fully
repaid at face value ¹L in non-default states y 2 B0b.
In a perfectly competitive market, a riskless bank equates the expected
return function with the interest rate on deposits, ¹D. Williamson showed
that the depositors' expected cost of monitoring the bank goes to zero as
portfolio size goes to in¯nity because the portfolio earns ¹L with probability
one. The bank can then pay depositors reservation value ¹D with certainty.
The bank never defaults and the cost of delegation is nil. Williamson also
showed that the bank's expected return function ¦(¢) is concave in loan rate
¹L, thus it has an interior maximum at some ¹L¤. This can lead to equilibrium
credit rationing by loan quantity at ¹L¤. Even if a rationed borrower o®ered to
pay a loan rate higher than ¹L¤, the bank would refuse because ¹L¤ maximizes
the bank's expected return.6
2.3 Risky Banking
When a bank may default in some states, Krasa and Villamil (1992) showed
the following. (i) Banking remains optimal if monitoring costs are bounded
and the probability of default is su±ciently small. (ii) The optimal contract
is two-sided debt, where (L(y; µ); Bb) is the loan contract between the bank
and entrepreneurs, and (D(y); Bd) is the deposit contract between the bank
6When failure is costly to the lender, an increase in the loan rate may decrease the
bank's expected return because it raises the probability of borrower default.
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and lenders. As before, the bank funds m entrepreneurs using deposits from
mq¡1 lenders. However, on set Bb some projects default and the bank incurs
monitoring cost cb. On Bd the bank defaults and the mq¡1 depositors incur
monitoring cost cd.
When banking is risky and default occurs in state s = l, the bank's
incentive constraint, which insures that it requests costly state veri¯cation
of entrepreneurs in bankruptcy states, depends on:
(i) Bank assets: revenue from loan portfolio ¼(¢) = qPmi=1min(L(yi; µi); ¹Li)
(ii) Bank liabilities: the bank owes depositors D(¼b(L; µ; s))
(iii) Bank costs to monitor the yi that default: C = cbN(s)
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A risky bank's ability to repay depositors (i.e., its liabilities) depends on
its asset portfolio. Assume that the bank's total revenue is homogeneous.
Then the bank's incentive constraint is
X
s=l;h
ps [¼(L; µ; s)¡D(¼b(L; µ; s))¡ C(s)] =
¹D
q
(2)
Because the bank arises endogenously (i.e., investors delegate monitoring to
one investor), the bank must earn the same expected return per project as
the remaining investors, ¹D=q.8
The depositor's incentive constraint, which insures that depositors request
costly state veri¯cation of the bank in bankruptcy states, is derived as follows.
Depositors must monitor whenever D(¼b(L; µ; s)) is less than ¹D, incurring
cost Cd = cdM(s)(mq ¡ 1), where M(s) is a binary variable that equals one
if the bank defaults and the mq ¡ 1 depositors monitor and zero otherwise.
Thus, the depositor's incentive constraint is given by
X
s=l;h
ps [D(¼b(L; µ; s))¡ Cd(s)] =
¹D
q
(mq ¡ 1) (3)
As the number of loans goes to in¯nity, the bank can eliminate idiosyn-
cratic risk but not default risk. Thus, the income from its loan portfolio may
not be su±cient to fully repay depositors in some states, and the depositors
7N(s) is the number of projects that default.
8See Williamson (1986) or Krasa and Villamil (1992) for proofs of the optimality of
delegated monitoring relative to direct investment without and with risk, respectively.
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will monitor the bank. We assume that the bank defaults in state s = l. The
risky bank's expected return function, which must be non-negative, is
X
s=l;h
ps
264Z
Bb
(L(¢)¡ cb
q
)dG(¢) +
Z
B0b
¹LdG(¢)¡D(¼b(L; µ; s))
375 (4)
2.4 Comparison of Riskless vs. Risky Banking
In Section 2.2, (1) established that
¦(¢) = ¹D
In the Appendix we show that because a risky bank sometimes defaults,
depositors' expected monitoring costs raise the e®ective reservation return
to
¦(¢) = ¹D + ½
The term ½ = plqcd re°ects the cost of default. This risk premium depends on
the size of depositor monitoring cost cd, project scale q, and the probability
that the low state will occur, pl.
The bank's expected return function ¦(L(y; µ); µ; s), given by (16) in the
Appendix, has two important properties. The proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1: Assume cbg(0; µ) < q and
cb
q
gx(x; µ) + g(x; µ) > 0.
9
(a) ¦(L(y; µ); µ; s) is concave in L, given µ.
(b) ¦(L(y; µ); µ; s) is decreasing in µ, for ¹L = ¹L¤ and given ¹D.
Property (a) is Williamson's credit rationing result for a ¯xed portfolio
quality level, µ. Williamson (1986) showed that in the costly state veri¯cation
model with no risk of bank default, credit rationing by loan quantity can
occur because the bank's expected return function is concave. Concavity
follows from the fact that an increase in the loan rate has two e®ects on
¦(¢): Revenue increases as ¹L increases, but expected monitoring costs also
increase. The second e®ect occurs because raising ¹L raises the probability
that bankruptcy will occur. The second e®ect may dominate the ¯rst for
su±ciently high loan rates. Concavity implies that there is an optimal loan
value ¹L¤. When credit rationing by loan quantity occurs, some borrowers
9These assumptions are standard. For example, see Boyd and Smith (1997).
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are fully funded while other observationally identical borrowers are not.10
A rationed entrepreneur will not get additional credit even if the agent is
willing to pay ¹L > ¹L¤ because this would reduce bank pro¯t. Property (b)
states that the expected return function is decreasing in µ.
Insert Figure 1
Consider Figure 1, which shows the bank's expected return funtion ¦(¢).
The interest rate on loans, ¹L, is measured on the x-axis and the bank's
expected revenue is measured on the y axis. Quality is measured as a mean
preserving change in the variance of the distribution of loan returns, where
an increase in µ decreases the \quality" of loan applicants. The Figure shows
that ¦(¢) is concave and reaches a maximum at ¹L¤. Further as µ increases,
with µB > µA, the expected return function ¦(¢)) shifts down.
Proposition 2 establishes that there is an optimal quality cuto® level, µA.
Proposition 2: Assume cbg(0; µ) < q and
cb
q
gx(x; µ) + g(x; µ) > 0. Then
there is an optimal quality threshold level µA such that
² If µi · µA: the entrepreneur is ¯nanced
² If µi > µA: the entrepreneur is rationed
Proposition 2 indicates that banks sort loan applicants based on quality using
critical value µA. All µ above the threshold (i.e., high variance or low quality
applicants) are rationed. Threshold quality level µA is an additional form
of credit rationing that to our knowledge has not been considered in the
economic literature previously.
In the remainder of the paper we ¯rst analyze the e®ect of default risk on
these two forms of credit rationing, loan quantity and loan quality. Second,
we analyze the qualitative e®ect of other structural changes in the economic
environment on the bank's problem. Finally, we consider a parametric ex-
ample to illustrate the quantitative signi¯cance of the results.
10Credit rationing by loan quantity operates as follows. Suppose that loan demand is
(1 ¡ ®)q and loan supply is ® with w = 1. If at ¹L¤ there is excess demand in the loan
market, then (1¡®)q > ®. In order to ration this excess demand ® borrowers are randomly
selected from the (1 ¡ ®)q potential borrowers. Those ® borrowers are fully funded at q
units each. The other observationally identical borrowers gets zero.
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3 The Loan Market
Equilibrium in the loan market results from the equality of demand by bor-
rowers and supply by lenders. Each borrower demands q units of credit to
invest in the ¯xed scale project. Total loan demand is thus (1¡®)q. Propo-
sitions 1 and 2 show that credit rationing can occur for two distinct reasons,
thus we model the loan market as follows. Let u · 1 be the fraction of
entrepreneurs that receive credit for a given quality level µA.
(i) Proposition 1 shows that credit rationing by loan quantity, u < 1, is due
to the concavity of the bank's expected pro¯t function.
(ii) Proposition 2 shows that banks also ration credit by adjusting quality
cuto® µA. Since H(µA) is the distribution of project quality, by varying
µA the bank adjusts portfolio quality to clear the market.
The demand for bank loans by entrepreneurs is (1¡®)quH(µ). The total
supply of funds is ®w. Because the ® lenders have an outside investment
opportunity with return x, they will divert funds away from banks if x exceeds
the deposit interest rate ¹D. Then the supply of funds by depositors to banks
is ®wH( ¹D). Assume that the economy has excess credit demand, (1¡®)q >
®w. Then the loan market equilibrium is given by
(1¡ ®)uqH(µ) ¸ ®wH( ¹D)
Finally, banks must satisfy a reserve requirement ¹± that constrains the
amount the bank can lend. A reserve requirement has two e®ects
(i) Banks face an additional constraint, ±(µ) ¸ ¹±, where ±(µ) = (1¡H(µ))¡k.
This speci¯cation of ±(µ) captures the idea that banks choose the op-
timal µA given the reserve requirement. Constant k takes into account
that banks choose portfolio quality even if ¹± is zero.
(ii) Banks must keep a proportion of deposits on hand to satisfy the reserve
requirement. This further reduces the supply of credit to
(1¡ ®)uqH(µ) ¸ ®wH( ¹D)(1¡ ¹±)
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4 Credit Rationing
Assume perfect competition. We now state the bank's problem, and analyze
it with and without default risk. Let ½ = plqcd denote default premium.
When ½ = 0 there is no default risk and when ½ > 0 default risk exists.
The Bank's Problem. Choose ¹L, ¹D, and µ to maximize
¦(L; µ) ¸ ¹D + ½ (5)
Subject to:
(1¡ ®)uqH(µ) · ®wH( ¹D)(1¡ ¹±) (6)
(1¡H(µ))¡ k ¸ ¹± (7)
The bank chooses loan and deposit rates and a portfolio quality threshold
to maximize its expected return.11 Depositor incentive compatibility, (5),
requires a risky bank's expected return to be at least as great as the risk
augmented depositor reservation level, ¹D+½. The bank is also constrained by
loan market equilibrium condition (6), which acts as a feasibility constraint,
and the reserve requirement (7).
Our goals are two-fold. First, we analyze the factors that a®ect the two
types of credit rationing. We pay particular attention to portfolio quality
selection (i.e., the bank's choice of threshold µA) since this is a core opera-
tional function of a bank, is intrinsically related to default risk, has not been
studied previously. Portfolio quality selection is irrelevant for a riskless bank,
but it is crucial for \risky banks." Second, we will show both analytically and
quantitatively that default risk interacts with both types of credit rationing.
This can cause large interest rate spreads, \credit crunches," and a banking
equilibrium to fail.
To solve the bank's problem, consider two cases described by Figure 2:
² Case 1. loan quantity rationing, u < 1: Not all borrowers of a given
µ who request a loan receive one. ¹L is ¯xed at the maximum income
level for a given µ, ¹L¤(µ).12 Banks choose ¹D, µ and indirectly u.
11Proposition 1 shows that (5) is ¦(L; µ) = [¹L¡ cbq G(L; µ; s)¡
LR
0
dG(y; µ; s)].
12The condition for this type of credit rationing is given in Proposition 3 below.
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² Case 2. portfolio quality rationing, u = 1: Since ¹L is ¯xed, banks
maximize with respect to ¹L, ¹D and µ.
To simplify, assume that the distribution of returns on the outside alternative
is uniform, thus I(x) = x
¹x
, where x = ¹D in a competitive market.
Insert Figure 2
Figure 2 illustrates the two rationing cases in the credit market and in the
bank's expected return function. The top graph shows credit supply (LS)
and two di®erent cases for credit demand(LD1 and LD2). The bottom graph
is the bank's expected return function.
² In case 1, there is excess demand in the credit market (loan demand
LD1 and loan supply LS do not intersect and ED is the amount of
excess demand in the top Figure). If u were to equal 1, the bank
could not obtain su±cient expected return from its loan portfolio to
pay depositors the market clearing rate ¹D + ½0. Thus, the bottom
graph shows that the bank chooses µA and u < 1 to ration credit when
¹L = ¹L¤. The bank takes ¹D + ½0 as given in a competitive market.
² In case 2, loan supply equals loan demand (LS = LD2) and u = 1. For
a given ¹D + ½, the bank chooses µA to ration credit and ¹L < ¹L¤.
This graph provides the intuition for the results. We will derive the results
formally in the next two sections.
Before beginning the formal analysis, return to Figure 1 to see that default
risk also has implications for quality selection. When The expected return
function evaluated at the optimal loan rate ¹L¤(µ) is: 13
¦(¹L¤(µ); µ) = Ã(µ)
Proposition 2 shows that for a given ¹D+½, there is an optimal µA (see A and
¦(µA) in Figure 1). The Figure shows that depositors at a risky bank must
be compensated for the expected monitoring costs they bear by higher bank
expected return. For the same loan rate ¹L¤, bank expected return must be
higher at a risky bank (¦(µA)) than at a riskless bank (¦(µB)). The risky
13The interest rate on loans is endogenous, and depends on the distribution of project
returns. It can decrease, increase or remain constant when µ changes. In Figure 1 we
assume that it remains constant.
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bank chooses a tighter quality cuto® µA, which implies the higher ¦(µA).
Ceteris paribus, default risk increases quality rationing: Entrepreneurs with
qualities between µA > µ > µB are rationed now.
4.1 Case 1. Rationing by Loan Quantity: u < 1
When rationing by loan quantity occurs, the fraction of entrepreneurs of a
given quality that receive loans is less than one (i.e., u < 1) and ¹L is ¯xed
at the maximum income level for a given µ, ¹L = ¹L¤(µ). Banks choose ¹D, µ
and indirectly u (i.e., the fraction of loan requests to grant). Consider the
equations in the bank's problem, (5), (6) and (7).
Bank expected return is ¦(¹L¤(µ); µ) = Ã(µ). From (5), for a riskless bank
¦(¹L¤(µ); µ) = ¹D, and for a risky bank ¦(¹L¤(µ); µ) = ¹D + ½. Since u < 1,
loan market equilibrium condition (6) is
u =
®w(1¡ ¹±) ¹D
(1¡ ®)qG(µA)¹x < 1 (8)
There is no change in the reserve requirement (7).
A riskless bank's expected revenue equals the deposit rate, Ã(µ) = ¹D.
Solving (8) for ¹D and imposing Ã(µ) = ¹D gives
Ã(µ) <
(1¡ ®)qG(µA)¹x
®w(1¡ ¹±) (9)
This condition means that the bank cannot obtain su±cient expected return
from its loan portfolio to pay depositors the market clearing deposit rate. As
a consequence, rationing by loan quantity arises (see Case 1 in Figure 2); the
bank can not ¯nance all applicants.This situation arises whenever the return
from borrowers is not su±cient to cover the deposit rate. Williamson showed
that this type of rationing can occur for riskless banks, but we will now show
that default risk deepens the problem.
When there is default risk and u < 1, ¹L is ¯xed at the maximum in-
come level for a given µ. Comparative static results in Claim 4.11 show the
following. First, default risk does not a®ect the quality cuto®, µA. Second,
quantity rationing increases as default risk increases.14 Third, the deposit
rate goes down by the same amount as the increase in the default premium,
14A numerical example in Section 6 shows that an increase in ½ leads to a more than 13
fold decrease in u.
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due to a decrease in u (i.e., an increase in credit rationing by loan quantity).
Thus, the deposit rate and u adjust to restore an equilibrium.
Claim 4.11. When banks ration credit by loan quantity (i.e., ¹L(µ) = ¹L¤(µ),
(9) is satis¯ed and ½ > 0), then as the default premium increases
(i) dµ
d½
= 0: There is no e®ect on portfolio quality.
(ii) du
d½
= ¡ ®w(1¡¹±)
¹x(1¡®)qH(µ) < 0: Quantity rationing increases (u declines).
(iii) d
¹D
d½
= ¡1: There is a one-for-one decrease in the deposit rate.
To understand the intuition for Claim 4.11, recall that ¹D + ½ = Ã(µ).
Thus, if it were the case that u = 1, then (9) implies that for a risky bank
Ã(µ)¡ ½ < (1¡ ®)qH(µ)¹x
®w(1¡ ¹±) (10)
This equation means that if the risky bank granted all loan requests at the
given quality level (u = 1), it would not obtain an expected return su±cient
to pay the market clearing rate on deposits. Thus the bank cannot ¯nance
all applicants, because default risk causes the expected return on the bank's
portfolio to decrease. Equation (10) shows that this credit rationing by loan
size is more likely to occur as default risk increases.
We summarize this result formally in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. When ¹L = ¹L¤, (10) is satis¯ed, and ½ > 0, then credit
rationing by loan size occurs, i.e., u < 1.
Proposition 3 establishes that in order for quantity rationing to occur,
banks are already at the maximum expected revenue and ¹L(µ) = ¹L¤(µ).
Therefore an increase in default risk has no e®ect on the loan rate.15 As the
default premium (½) increases, banks become less pro¯table and attract less
deposits. The outside opportunity becomes more attractive and banks lose
their deposit base. As a result of this dis-intermediation, Claim 4.11 shows
that quantity rationing increases since less funding is available for borrowers
15An increase in ½ can trigger the transition from only quality to quality and quantity
rationing. See Table 7 for a numerical example which shows that for a riskless bank u = 1,
but when default risk ½ increases then u < 1 and rationing by loan quantity occurs.
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and the interest rate spread increases. The increase in risk has no e®ect on
the quality cuto® in this case.16
Williamson showed that credit rationing by loan quantity can arise even
when banks are not risky (i.e., ½ = 0). Proposition 3 indicates that default
risks deepens this type of rationing because (10) is more likely to be satis¯ed
when ½ > 0. To illustrate this, we perform comparative statics on (10).
Assume that equation (10) holds as an equality. Then:
Claim 4.12. As w, ®, ¹x, ¹±, or q increase
(i) d(Ã(µ)¡½)
dw
= ¡ (1¡®)qH(µ)¹x
®w2(1¡¹±) < 0 and
d(Ã(µ)¡½)
d®
= ¡ qH(µ)¹x
®2w(1¡¹±)2 < 0
(ii) d(Ã(µ)¡½)
d¹x
= (1¡®)qH(µ)
®w(1¡¹±) > 0;
d(Ã(µ)¡½)
d¹±
= (1¡®)qH(µ)¹x
®w(1¡¹±)2 > 0;
d(Ã(µ)¡½)
dq
=
(1¡®)H(µ)¹x
®w(1¡¹±) > 0
Part (i) indicates that credit rationing by loan quality is less likely if
there is an increase in the supply of funds, due to either an increase in wages
or an increase in lenders. Part (ii) indicates that credit rationing is more
likely in two cases. First, if there is a decrease in the supply of funds, due to
an increase in the return on the outside opportunity or reserve requirement.
Second, if there is an increase in the demand for funds due to an increase in
the minimum project scale.
4.2 Case 2. Rationing by Loan Quality: u = 1
Assume that there is no credit rationing by loan quantity, so u = 1. Banks
choose ¹L, ¹D and µ.17 Given the reserve requirement, banks select µ so that
±(µA; 1) = ¹±
Then solving equations (6) and (7) with u = 1, we get ¹LA and ¹D such that
(1¡ ®)qG(µA) = ®wH( ¹D)(1¡ ±(µA; 1))
First consider the case for a riskless bank. The deposit rate equals
¹D =
(1¡ ®)qG(µA)¹x
®w(1¡ ¹±) (11)
16Note that (7) ¯xes the cuto® µA. The bank attains the maximum expected revenue,
but the supply of loanable funds is insu±cient to ¯nance all loan applicants (i.e., clear
(6)). See Guzman (2001), footnote 6.
17Given the assumption that H( ¹D) has a uniform distribution and that H( ¹D) < 1, then
(1¡ ®)q > ®wH( ¹D) (there is excess demand in the loan market for projects).
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The interest rate on loans is the ¹LA that solves
¼(¹LA; µ
A) =
(1¡ ®)qG(µA)¹x
®w(1¡ ¹±)
This interest rate is lower than ¹L¤ = ´(µA) since there is no rationing by loan
quantity (u = 1).
Now consider the case for a risky bank. Equation (5) holds and depositors
must be compensated for default risk ½ = plqcd. The bank's expected revenue
function is now given by
¦(¹L; µ) ¸ ¹D + plqcd
To make the results comparable, we assume that the deposit rate is the same
as in the case with no default risk. Banks again maximize expected revenue
subject to equations (6) and (7), selecting ¹D, ¹L and µ and taking into account
the default premium. From (7), µ = µA and ±(µA; 1) = ¹±. Equation (10) holds
with equality, and ¹D is the same as in the case with no default risk. Since
the bank must now compensate depositors for the expected recovery cost in
case of bankruptcy, the interest rate on loans is higher than when there is
no default risk. Then ¹LL > ¹LA. But this interest rate is still lower than
¹L¤ = ´(µA), since there is no rationing by loan quantity.18
Total di®erentiation of (5), (6) and (7) allows us to establish the following
comparative static results about the e®ect of default premium on interest
rates and the quality cuto®:
Claim 4.2. When banks ration credit by loan quality, then as the default
premium increases
(i) d
¹L
d½
= 1
¼¹L
> 0: The loan rate increases.
(ii) dµ
d½
= 0: There is no e®ect on portfolio quality.
(iii) d
¹D
d½
= 0: There is no e®ect on the deposit rate.
Under quality rationing an increase in default premium generates an in-
crease in the loan rate. However, there is no e®ect on the quality cuto® or on
the deposit rate. Only the spread is a®ected. Since banks have not reached
18As in Guzman (2000), we divide the analysis of the bank's problem into two cases:
u < 1 and u = 1. As Proposition 3 indicates, for u < 1 to hold it must be the case that
the bank is already at the maximum expected return level with ¹L = ¹L¤(µ). Otherwise,
u = 1 and there is no rationing by loan quantity.
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the maximum expected return, an increase in the loan rate can still increase
expected return. Therefore banks transfer the increase in the default pre-
mium to borrowers by increasing the loan rate. It is not necessary for banks
to tighten quality. See Section 6 for a numerical treatment of the case.
In summary, Figure 3 shows that a default premium generates an increase
in the loan rate from L0 to L1 due to the additional risk that banks must
compensate depositors for (i.e., ¹D+½ > ¹D). In order to do this, banks charge
a higher rate on loans. This increases the observed spread between deposit
and loan rates, a fact observed in many developing countries. Note that in
Figure 3, L0 < L1 < ¹L
¤. Since L < ¹L¤, the conditions of Proposition 3 are
not satis¯ed and rationing by loan quantity does not occur.
Insert Figure 3
5 Comparative Statics
We now analyze the comparative static properties of the model. >From
an initial equilibrium, totally di®erentiate equations (5), (6) and (7) with
respect to the endogenous policy variables, ¹L; ¹D; µ, and u, given changes in
exogenous variables ¹±, q, ¹x, cb and cd. This allows us to analyze how rationing
by portfolio quality (µ), quantity rationing (u), and loan and deposit rate
spreads (¹L¡ ¹D) react to changes in regulation ¹±, project scale q, the return
on alternative assets ¹x, and monitoring costs cb and cd.
5.1 Credit Rationing by Loan Quantity: u < 1
In this case when the conditions of Proposition 3 are satis¯ed, banks choose
u < 1 to ration credit. Recall that ¹L = ¹L¤(µ) is ¯xed at the optimal level.
In matrix notation, totally di®erentiating the system yields0B@ ¼µ 0 ¡1(1¡ ®)qh(µ)u (1¡ ®)qH(µ) ¡®w(1¡¹±)¹x¡h(µ) 0 0
1CA
0B@ dµdu
d ¹D
1CA
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=0B@ 0 1
½
q
0 ¡¼cb plq
¡®w ¹D
¹x
0 ¡(1¡ ®)H(µ)u ¡®w ¹D(1¡¹±)
¹x2
0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
1CA
0BBBBBBBB@
d¹±
d½
dq
d¹x
dcb
dcd
1CCCCCCCCA
The determinant is ¢ = ¡(1¡ ®)qH(µ)h(µ) < 0:
We summarize the comparative static exercises as a series of Claims.
Claim 5.11. When banks ration credit by loan quantity, and ¹L(µ) = ¹L¤(µ),
then as the reserve requirement increases
(i) dµ
d¹±
= ¡ 1
h(µ)
< 0: Portfolio quality increases.
(ii) du
d¹±
= ¡((1¡®)qu¹x¡®w
¹D)h(µ)+®w ¹D¼µ
¹x¢
> 0: Quantity rationing decreases.
(iii) d
¹D
d¹±
= ¡ ¼µ
h(µ)
> 0: The deposit rate increases.
An increase in the reserve requirement increases excess demand in the
loan market. The bank reacts to this by tightening its loan quality standard.
The increase in portfolio quality allows banks to pay a higher deposit rate
since the bank's expected return increases as result of its better loan portfolio.
This permits a decrease in rationing by loan quantity. The ¯nal e®ect on the
deposit rate and quantity rationing depends on the marginal e®ect of quality
on expected revenue. Banks pay a higher rate on deposits due to the increase
in expected return that results from a better portfolio.
Claim 5.12. When banks ration credit by loan quantity, and ¹L(µ) = ¹L¤(µ),
then as the project scale increases
(i) dµ
dq
= 0: There is no e®ect on the quality threshold.
(ii) du
dq
= ¡[u
q
+ ®w(1¡
¹±)
¹x(1¡®)qH(µ) ] < 0: Quantity rationing increases.
(iii) d
¹D
dq
= ¡½
q
< 0: The deposit rate decreases.
Changes in project scale (q) generate an e®ect that is qualitatively similar
to an increase in the default premium (cf., Claim 4.11). There is no e®ect
on the quality cuto®. The increase in loan demand increases the default
premium since it is more costly for depositors to monitor the bank. Therefore,
quantity rationing increases and the deposit rate is reduced. Compared with
an increase in the default premium, the e®ect of an increase in the project
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scale is lower on the deposit rate but larger on credit rationing by loan
quantity.
Claim 5.13. When banks ration credit by loan quantity, and ¹L(µ) = ¹L¤(µ),
then as the return on the outside asset increases
(i) dµ
d¹x
= 0: There is no e®ect on the quality threshold.
(ii) du
d¹x
= ¡ ®w ¹D(1¡¹±)
¹x(1¡®)qH(µ) < 0: Quantity rationing increases.
(iii) d
¹D
d¹x
= 0: There is no e®ect on the deposit rate.
As the return on the outside investment opportunity (¹x) increases, banks
react by rationing loan quantity. An increase in the outside opportunity gen-
erates a decrease in banks' deposit base, a disintermediation result. There-
fore, quantity rationing increases and portfolio quality stays the same.
Claim 5.14. When banks ration credit by loan quantity, and ¹L(µ) = ¹L¤(µ),
then as the bank veri¯cation cost increases
(i) dµ
dcb
= 0: There is no e®ect on the quality threshold.
(ii) du
dcb
= ¼cb [
®w(1¡¹±)
¹x(1¡®)qH(µ) ] < 0: Quantity rationing increases.
(iii) d
¹D
dcb
= ¼cb < 0: The deposit rate decreases.
Claim 5.15. When banks ration credit by loan quantity, and ¹L(µ) = ¹L¤(µ),
then as the depositor veri¯cation cost increases
(i) dµ
dcd
= 0: There is no e®ect on the quality threshold.
(ii) du
dcd
= ¡[ ®w(1¡¹±)
¹x(1¡®)qH(µ) ] < 0: Quantity rationing increases.
(iii) d
¹D
dcd
= ¡plq < 0: The deposit rate decreases.
The results are qualitatively similar for both monitoring costs. Monitor-
ing costs have no e®ect on the quality threshold. Increases in veri¯cation
costs exacerbate quantity rationing and drive the deposit rate down because
when ½ increases both u and ¹D adjust to clear the loan market.
The comparative static results for rationing by loan quantity reported in
Claims 4.11 and 5.11 { 5.15 are summarized in the following Table.
Table 1: Quantity Rationing
Quantity Rationing ½ ¹± q ¹x cb cd
u (¡) (+) (¡) (¡) (¡) (¡)
µ (0) (¡) (0) (0) (0) (0)
¹D (¡) (+) (¡) (0) (¡) (¡)
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5.2 Quality Rationing: u = 1
Suppose there is quality rationing only (i.e., no quantity rationing u = 1).
Then totally di®erentiating system in matrix notation yields0B@¼¹L ¼µ ¡10 (1¡ ®)qh(µ) ¡®w(1¡¹±)
¹x
0 ¡h(µ) 0
1CA
0B@ d¹Ldµ
d ¹D
1CA
=
0B@ 0 1
½
q
0 ¡¼cb plq
¡®w ¹D
¹x
0 ¡(1¡ ®)H(µ) ¡®w ¹D(1¡¹±)
¹x
0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
1CA
0BBBBBBBB@
d¹±
d½
dq
d¹x
dcb
dcd
1CCCCCCCCA
The determinant is given by ¢ = ¼¹L(¡h(µ)®w(1¡¹±)¹x ) < 0 since ¼¹L > 0.
We obtain the following comparative static results.
Claim 5.21. When banks ration credit by loan quality, then as the reserve
requirement increases
(i) d
¹L
d¹±
= ¡ ¹x(1¡®)q¡®w ¹D
¼¹L®w(1¡¹±) +
¼µ
¼¹Lh(µ)
< 0: The loan rate decreases.
(ii) dµ
d¹±
= ¡h(µ) < 0: Portfolio quality increases.
(iii) d
¹D
d¹±
= ¡ ¹x(1¡®)q¡®w ¹D
®w(1¡¹±) < 0: The deposit rate decreases.
A change in the reserve requirement leads to a similar change in the
quality cuto®. This \°ight to quality" allows banks to charge a lower interest
rate on loans. On the other hand, an increase in the reserve requirement
generates an additional cost to banks that lowers the interest rate on deposits.
Claim 5.22. When banks ration credit by loan quality, then as the project
scale increases
(i) d
¹L
dq
= ¹x(1¡®)H(µ)
¼¹L®w(1¡¹±) +
½
q¼¹L
> 0: The loan rate increases.
(ii) dµ
dq
= 0: There is no e®ect on portfolio quality.
(iii) d
¹D
dq
= ¡ (1¡®)H(µ)¹x
(1¡¹±)®w > 0: The deposit rate increases.
A change in project scale generates an increase in loan demand, therefore
the loan rate increases. A larger project scale increases the default premium
since it increases the depositors' veri¯cation cost if default occurs. The loan
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rate increases more than the increase in the deposit rate in order to compen-
sate for the extra cost. The spread increases due to the e®ect of increased
credit demand and increased risk. Note that d
¹L
dq
= 1
¼¹L
(d
¹D
dq
+ ½
q
), meaning that
spread increases as the project scale increases, given the e®ect of q on the
default premium.
Claim 5.23. When banks ration credit by loan quality, then as the return
on the outside investment opportunity increases
(i) d
¹L
d¹x
=
¹D
¹x¼¹L
> 0: The loan rate increases.
(ii) dµ
d¹x
= 0: There is no e®ect on portfolio quality.
(iii) d
¹D
d¹x
=
¹D
¹x
> 0: The deposit rate increases.
As the maximum return on the outside investment opportunity increases,
banks increase the deposit rate. Quality does not change, and the loan rate
increases to compensate for the extra cost that is necessary to retain funds.
Claim 5.24. For ¹L · ¹L¤(µ), when banks ration credit by loan quality, then
as the bank veri¯cation cost increases
(i) d
¹L
dcb
= ¡¼cb
¼¹L
> 0: The loan rate increases.
(ii) dµ
dcb
= 0: There is no e®ect on portfolio quality.
(iii) d
¹D
dcb
= 0: There is no e®ect on the deposit rate.
Claim 5.25. For ¹L · ¹L¤(µ), when banks ration credit by loan quality, then
as the depositors' veri¯cation cost increases
(i) d
¹L
dcd
= plq
¼¹L
> 0: The loan rate increases.
(ii) dµ
dcd
= 0: There is no e®ect on portfolio quality.
(iii) d
¹D
dcd
= 0: There is no e®ect on the deposit rate.
The results are qualitatively similar for both the bank's and the deposi-
tors' monitoring costs. We discuss this case in detail in Section 6.
The comparative static results are summarized in the Table below.
Table 2: Quality Rationing
Quality Rationing ½ ¹± q ¹x dcb dcd
¹L (+) (¡) (+) (+) (+) (+)
µ (0) (¡) (0) (0) (0) (0)
¹D (0) (¡) (+) (+) (0) (0)
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6 Numerical Example
We now solve a numerical example to illustrate credit rationing by loan
quantity, credit rationing by loan quality, and the e®ect of the key parameters
on the loan market. We assume that H( ¹D) =
¹D
¹x
is uniformly distributed and
that H(µ) = µ is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Then the bank's
problem is
max ¦(¹L; µ) ¸ ¹D + ½
subject to: (1¡ ®)quµ · ®w ¹D
¹x
(1¡ ¹±)
(1¡ µ)¡ k ¸ ¹±
The system is solved using the following baseline parametric values:
Table 3: Baseline Parameter Values
Parameter Symbol Value
Project scale q 1:5
Wage w 0:75
Depositors ® 0:66
Entrepreneurs 1¡ ® 0:34
Bank Recovery Cost cb 0:6
Depositor Recovery Cost cd 0:6
Reserve Requirement ¹± 0:04
Outside Investment ¹x 0:078
Liquidity k 0:04
Default Probability pl 0 or 0:001
Aggregate Risk ½ 0 or 0:0009
Under these values it is easy to verify that there is excess demand in the loan
market, (1¡ ®)q > ®w.
We start by assuming that there is no default risk and solve the bank's
problem. We then introduce default risk and compare the results. Default
risk is introduced by assuming that G(y; µ; s) has a normal distribution with
mean 0:25 and a variance that changes between 0:09 and 0:12.19 In accor-
dance with Proposition 1, the expected revenue function is decreasing in
quality parameter µ and has an interior maximum for ¹L¤(µ). Banks face
a distribution of entrepreneurs with returns that have the same mean but
19In the Appendix we show that the results are similar for the log normal distribution.
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di®erent variances. An increase in the variance decreases the loan applicant
quality, and the bank's expected return decreases. The proof of Proposition
1 shows that the expected return function can be written
¼(¹L; µ) = ¹L¡ cb
q
G(¹L; µ)¡
¹LZ
0
dG(y; µ; s)
Recall Figure 1. It plots values for a normal distribution with mean
0:25, alternative levels of the variance, and the parameters in Table 3. The
expected return function shifts down as µ increases because quality decreases.
¦(¹L; µ) reaches a maximum for ¹L¤(µ) = 0:14, and ¹L¤(µ) is constant for
alternative values of µ. For µA = 0:82 the maximum expected revenue is
0.0909. For µB = 0:92, expected revenue reaches a maximum of 0.0778 as
predicted by the model. Banks charge a maximum loan rate of ¹L¤(µ) =
0:14. Expected revenue decreases for L > ¹L¤(µ), thus credit rationing by
loan quantity exists whenever the deposit rate reaches that maximum level.
Applicants do not get loans even if they are willing to pay a higher rate.
Since the mean expected value for projects is 0:25, investors, if funded, can
expect to get at least a 0:25¡ 0:14 = 0:11 net pro¯t.
6.1 Credit Rationing by Loan Quality: u = 1
Assume there is no default risk (½ = 0) and u = 1. The bank solves the
system of equations (5), (6) and (7). Equation (7) gives µ = 0:92 and from
(6) the solution for the deposit rate is ¹D = 0:076:Given these values, equation
(5) implies that ¹L = 0:123 is the optimal loan rate.
Now suppose there is default risk, with a premium of ½ = 0:0009. Solving
the system gives the same deposit rate and quality cuto®, but now the loan
rate is given by ¹L = 0:137, a twelve percent increase. Recall that ½ = plqcd,
q = 1:5, and that the depositor recovery cost is cd = 0:6 (the same as the
bank's recovery cost). The Table below shows that a very small increase in
default risk generates a large increase in the loan rate, even with no change in
the quality cuto®. Recall from Claim 4.2 that d
¹L
d½
= 1
¼¹L
> 0. Since ¦(¹L; µ) ¸
¹D+µ = 0:0776 in this example, 1
¼¹L
is a multiplier that is signi¯cantly greater
than one (numerical calculations reported in Table 8 in the Appendix show
that d
¹L
d½
= 12:69 for the example). Thus, relatively small increases in default
risk are ampli¯ed by the multipliers.
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Table 4: The E®ect of Default Risk: cd = 0:6, q = 1:5
Variable No Risk Risk
¹L 0:123 0:137
¹D 0:076 0:076
Spread 0:047 0:061
µ 0:92 0:92
u 1 1
pl ¡ 0:001
½ 0 0:0009
Now suppose that the veri¯cation costs change. We analyze the quan-
titative e®ect of a change in cb on interest rates when u = 1 but portfolio
quality can be varied. Suppose that the bank's cost to verify entrepreneurs,
cb, increases. Then the expected revenue function will decrease. Consider
a 10 and 12:5 percent change from an initial situation where cb = 0:6, to
cb = 0:606 and cb = :675. For a given deposit rate ¹D = 0:076, the loan rate
increases up to ¹L = 0:125 for cb = 0:606. When cb = 0:675 no loan rate can
generate a bene¯t equal to ¹D = 0:076. Therefore, the bank must increase
quality rationing. A change in quality that moves the baseline quality level
to µ = 0:88 generates enough revenue to keep ¹L = 0:121, but now credit
rationing has increased by 4 percent from µ = 0:92 to µ = 0:88. See the
Table below.
Table 5: Increases in Bank Monitoring Costs
Veri¯cation Cost Increase Interest Rate on Loans Increase
cb = 0:6 baseline ¹L = 0:123 0
cb = 0:606 10 ¹L = 0:125 1%
cb = 0:675 12:5 no equilibrium ¡
Consider now an increase in the depositors' veri¯cation cost. This change
only a®ects the default premium parameter ½. >From the initial situation of
cd = 0:6, increase cd by 10 and 12:5 percent. Then for q = 1:5 and pl = 0:001;
when cd = 0:606 the loan rate increases to ¹L = 0:136 as Claim 5.25 predicts.
When cd = 0:675, the loan rate increases to 0:141 and credit rationing by
quantity emerges. No loan rate exists that can generate enough expected rev-
enue to cover an expected augmented deposit return of 0:078. Therefore, the
bank must tighten the quantity cuto® to compensate depositors. Indeed, the
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quantity cuto® is tightened to u = 0:95, a ¯ve percent decrease to generate
a new equilibrium. The results are summarized in the following table.
Table 6: Increases in Depositor Monitoring Costs
Veri¯cation Cost Increase Interest Rate on Loans Increase
cd = 0:6 baseline ¹L = 0:123 0
cd = 0:606 10 ¹L = 0:136 9:7%
cd = 0:675 12:5 ¹L = 0:141 14:6%
6.2 Quality and Quantity Rationing: u < 1
Credit rationing by both loan quality and quantity can arise if the default
premium increases up to a value ½ ¸ 0:0009 in this example20. This occurs be-
cause the bank's expected return for a given quality (µ = 0:92) does not cover
the opportunity cost of funds ( ¹D = 0:0778).21 When there is default risk and
pl = 0:01, the maximum expected return from loan rate ¹L
¤ = 0:141 does not
generate enough revenue to cover the interest rate on deposits. Therefore,
equilibrium is reached by increasing credit rationing by loan quantity. Hence,
u = 0:89 and ¹D = 0:0686 are the equilibrium values now. This example il-
lustrates the case where, when there is no default risk, rationing by quality
only occurs. This follows from the fact that ¹L < ¹L¤, thus the conditions of
Proposition 3 are not satis¯ed. As a consequence u¤ = 1, and it is optimal
to ration only by quality. However, the introduction of default risk drives ¹L
up to ¹L¤, and u¤ < 1 is required to clear the loan market. Thus, default risk
deepens credit rationing by causing a market with rationing by quality only
to have rationing by both quality and quantity. The results are summarized
below.
Table 7: Increase in Default Risk: cd = 0:6, q = 1:5
20From ¹D = 0:076 an increase of ½ ¸ 0:0009 leads to quantity rationing
21Default risk is not a necessary or su±cient condition for credit rationing by loan
quantity, as Williamson showed. This type of credit rationing can arise without default
risk if the expected return for a given quality level is low enough. However, Table 7 shows
that default risk exacerbates the problem, signi¯cantly widening interest rate spreads.
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pl 0 0:01 0:02 0:03 0:05 0:06 0:07
¹L 0:137 0:141 0:141 0:141 0:141 0:141 0:141
¹D 0:0776 0:0686 0:0596 0:0506 0:0326 0:0236 0:0146
Spread 0:05 0:0724 0:0814 0:0904 0:1084 0:1174 0:1264
µ 0:92 0:92 0:92 0:92 0:92 0:92 0:92
u 1 0:89 0:78 0:66 0:42 0:3 0:2
½ 0 0:009 0:018 0:027 0:045 0:054 0:063
6.3 Discussion of the Numerical Results
The parametric example illustrates the quantitative signi¯cance of the com-
parative static results. From an initial situation with credit rationing by loan
quality only, the introduction of default risk has an important impact on the
loan rate, the deposit rate, and therefore on the spread. Raising portfolio
default risk from a probability of pl = 0 to 0:01 raises the spread, from 0:05
to 0:0724 in Table 7. When pl rises to 0:07, the spread increases to 0:1264.
Banks charge the maximum loan rate and the deposit rate must decrease to
support an equilibrium. Credit rationing involves both quality and quantity
rationing. Loan approvals at cuto® quality level µ = 0:92 fall from 100%
(u = 1) to 20% as pl rises. In a general equilibrium setting this result implies
disintermediation.
Finally, veri¯cation costs also have a ¯rst order e®ect on interest rates and
credit rationing.22 As Claim 5.24 indicates, an increase in bank veri¯cation
cost reduces the expected return function and therefore increases the loan
rate. An increase of 12.5 percent in a bank's veri¯cation cost generates a non-
equilibrium result for the quality cuto® in this example. On the other hand,
an increase in depositors' veri¯cation costs increases the default premium.
This decreases the bank's expected return and the bank increases the loan
rate, as Claim 5.25 indicates. Indeed, an increase of 12.5 percent is not
consistent with an equilibrium in this example.
7 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the e®ect of default risk on banks. We show that the size
of the default premium, along with other parameters of the model, a®ects
22The actual e®ect of increases in veri¯cation costs depend on the initial situation.
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which of four possible equilibria occur. (i) Rationing by quality only occurs
when the conditions of Proposition 3 are satis¯ed. Default risk is borne
entirely by the loan rate. Neither the extent of credit rationing nor the
deposit rate changes, but the loan-deposit rate spread increases due to the
default premium. Claim 4.2 shows that the change in the spread is larger
than the change in the default premium, a type of multiplier e®ect. (ii) Credit
rationing by loan quantity arises when the bank's expected return for a given
quality level is not high enough. This can happen if the default premium is
high and/or the distribution of returns is unfavorable. Claim 4.11 shows
that under this type of credit rationing, the interest rate on loans is ¯xed
at the maximum return. An increase in the default premium is re°ected
in an increase in rationing by loan quantity and a decrease in the deposit
rate. Therefore, disintermediation results. (iii) Both types of credit rationing
can occur when the default premium is su±ciently high. The parametric
example showed that small amounts of default risk can induce large interest
rate spreads. (iv) For some parameter con¯gurations (e.g., large shocks or
monitoring costs), no banking equilibrium exists.
These results are consistent with the stylized facts observed in many
developing countries: large interest rate spreads, costly banking crises, and
reports of \credit crunches." The model suggests that these problems could
be reduced in two ways: First, by reducing the level of default risk. This could
be accomplished by better portfolio diversi¯cation or insurance opportunities.
Second, by improving structural conditions. This could be accomplished by
reducing monitoring costs and lowering returns on outside opportunities such
as government bonds. However, we believe that it is unlikely that portfolio
risk can be eliminated completely, thus the multipliers reported in Table 8
in the Appendix are interesting. They show that even small amounts of
default risk can have big e®ects. This model seems especially appropriate for
developing economies where default premium is often an important factor.
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9 Appendix
Williamson (1986) considered the following problem. Entrepreneurs propose loan
contracts in a planning period that are analyzed by a lender. A contract is a pair
(L(y; µ); Bb), where L(y; µ) is the loan repayment from an entrepreneur and Bb is
the set of realizations where the entrepreneur is monitored. Given the feasible set
of returns [0; ¹y], costly state veri¯cation occurs on set Bb. No monitoring occurs
on the complement B0b = [0; ¹y]¡Bb.
Simple debt is optimal because it minimizes expected monitoring costs. Given
realization y, the entrepreneur repays a ¯xed amount ¹L which is not contingent
on y, if y 2 B0b. If y 2 Bb, the entrepreneur transfers the entire y to the bank.
Incentive compatibility requires a ¯xed loan repayment ¹L > 0 in states where no
costly state veri¯cation occurs. This ¯xed amount is given by ¹L · argminy2Bby:
Williamson showed that the entrepreneur has the incentive to repay ¹L when this is
feasible because it economizes on deadweight monitoring costs. The entrepreneur
keeps the di®erence, y¡¹L, as pro¯t. For low realizations y 2 Bb, the bank monitors,
the entrepreneur gets zero, and the bank recovers y¡cb. Then ¹L(y; µ) · y, 8y 2 Bb:
Given this condition, Bb = [0; ¹L); since for any y ¸ ¹L the entrepreneur prefers to
pay ¹L.
First, Williamson showed that simple debt contract ¹L is optimal relative to
any other alternative debt contract A because it minimizes expected monitoring
costs.23 Consider two optimal contracts ¹L and A in the Figure below. To give the
borrower the same expected return, the face value of A must be strictly higher:
¹A > ¹L. Then clearly the expected monitoring costs are less for contract ¹L as
the Figure illustrates (i.e., the bankruptcy set where costly monitoring occurs
BLb ½ BAb ).
Insert Figure SDC
Second, Williamson showed that banking (i.e., delegated monitoring) is optimal
because it eliminates costly duplicative monitoring. If a bank contracts with m
entrepreneurs, then loan demand is mq since q is the scale of each project. In
order to satisfy this demand the bank needs mq ¡ 1 lenders. The bank receives
L(y; µ) from each entrepreneur and monitors if L(y; µ) < ¹L, incurring cost cb. The
bank's total revenue is given by ¼ = q
Pm
j=1min(L(y);
¹L). The monitoring cost is
given by C = cbN(s); where N(s) is the number of entrepreneurs that default. As
m!1, the bank diversi¯es idiosyncratic risk. By the law of large numbers, the
23In a simple debt contract the lender receives the entire realization when bankruptcy
occurs. In an arbitrary debt contracts the borrower may retain some output.
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expected revenue for a bank with a loan portfolio of size m is
p lim
m!1
1
mq
¼ =
Z
Bb
ÃL(y; µ)dG(y; µ; s) +
Z
B0b
¹LdG(y; µ; s) = ¼(L; µ)
Monitoring cost cb has a binomial distribution with parametersm and p =
R
Bb
dG(y; µ; s).
As m!1 it follows that24
p lim
m!1
1
mq
C =
cb
q
Z
Bb
dG(y; µ; s)
Thus when the bank never fails, i.e., s = ¹s, the expected return function for a bank
that contracts with an in¯nite number of entrepreneurs is given by (1). Williamson
showed that the depositors' expected cost of monitoring the bank goes to zero as
portfolio size goes to in¯nity because the portfolio earns ¹L with probability one.
The bank can then pay depositors reservation value ¹D with certainty and the cost
of delegation is nil.
Finally, Williamson showed that the bank's expected return function is concave
in loan rate ¹L, thus it has an interior maximum at some ¹L¤. This leads to equilib-
rium credit rationing by loan quantity at ¹L¤. Even if a rationed borrower o®ered
to pay a loan rate higher than ¹L¤, the bank would refuse because ¹L¤ maximizes the
bank's expected return. The intuition for this credit rationing by loan quantity is
that when failure is costly to the lender, an increase in the loan rate may decrease
the bank's expected return because it raises the probability of borrower default.
9.1 Risky Banking
Equation (1), which must equal ¹D, and (4), which must be non-negative, specify
the banks's expected pro¯t requirements without and with default risk, respec-
tively. The crucial di®erence is term
P
s=l;h
psD(¼b(L; µ; s)), which is the expected
payment from the bank to depositors. Because a risky bank will sometimes default,
depositors expect to incur monitoring costs. These expected monitoring costs raise
the \e®ective reservation return" that depositors must receive. We now consider
the implications of this.
When there is default risk, as m ! 1 depositor incentive compatibility con-
straint (3) can be writtenX
s=l;h
ps [D(¼b(L; µ; s)) + qcdM(s)] ¸ ¹D (12)
24Given that N(s) is a binomial distribution, by the Law of Large Numbers it converges
to m:p and m cancels out. With no default risk the bank does not default in the limit.
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This equation indicates that depositors must be compensated for expected mon-
itoring costs. As a bank diversi¯es idiosyncratic risk it obtains D(¼b(L; µ; s)) to
compensate depositors. But with default risk, the deadweight monitoring cost
must be accounted for. For some states M(s) = 1, and depositors incur moni-
toring cost qcd. If the bank is not risky, then M(s) = 0 and (12) simpli¯es toP
s=l;h
ps [D(¼b(L; µ; s))] ¸ ¹D:
The key insight is that the bank cannot eliminate default risk, even with an
in¯nite number of projects. Thus rewriting (4), depositors wish to insure that the
bank's pro¯t is high enough to enable them to recover their expected monitoring
costs in bankruptcy states. That is,X
s=l;h
ps[
Z
Bb
(L(y; µ)¡ cb
q
)dG(¢) +
Z
B0b
¹LdG(¢)] ¸
X
s=l;h
psD(¼b(L; µ; s)) (13)
The left hand side is the bank's expected return with no default risk. When
M(s) = 0, (13) reduces to (1). If the bank defaults in state s = l, M(l) = 1.
Then Bd = [L(y; µ) : D(¼b(L; µ; l)) < ¹D], and depositors monitor the bank with
probability pl ¸ 0: Evaluating depositor incentive constraint (12) givesX
s=l;h
psD(¼b(L; µ; s)) ¸ ¹D + plqcd (14)
Given (13), the depositor's incentive constraint can be written
X
s=l;h
ps
264Z
Bb
(L(y; µ)¡ cb
q
)dG(y; µ; s) +
Z
B0b
¹LdG(y; µ; s)
375 ¸ ¹D + plqcd (15)
The risky bank's expected return must be su±ciently high to compensate a de-
positor for both the opportunity cost of the reservation project and the expected
cost of recovering funds from the risky bank when it defaults. Thus, (15) can be
written
¦(L(y; µ; s); µ) ¸ ¹D + plqcd = Ã(µ) (16)
9.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Recall (1)
¦(L(y; µ); µ; s) =
Z
Bb
(L(y; µ)¡ cb
q
)dG(y; µ; s) +
Z
B0b
¹LdG(y; µ; s)
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Integrating by parts and solving gives
¦(L(y; µ); µ; s) = [¹L¡ cb
q
G(¹L; µ; s)¡
¹LZ
0
dG(y; µ; s)]
Let ¹L = x. Part (a) shows that, as in Williamson, ¼(x; µ) reaches a maximum
for x, given µ. Clearly
¼0(x; µ; s) = 1¡ cb
q
g(x; µ; s)¡G(x; µ; s) = 0
Solving this equation gives x¤ = ´(µ); ¹L¤(µ) = ´(µ) is the optimal loan rate.
The assumption that 1 > cbq g(0; µ; s), 8µ, assures that the pro¯t function
reaches an interior maximum for µ. Using the assumption
lim
x!0¼
0(x; µ; s) = 1¡ cb
q
g(0; µ; s)¡G(0; µ; s) ¸ 0
lim
x!¹y ¼
0(x; µ; s) = 1¡ cb
q
g(¹y; µ; s)¡ 1 · 0
Further,
¼00(x; µ; s) = ¡cb
q
g0(x; µ; s)¡ g(x; µ; s)
Then ¼(x; µ; s) reaches a maximum for x as a function of µ, given the assumptions.
To prove part (b), recall that ¹L = ¹L¤(µ) is the loan rate that maximizes the
expected pro¯t function. Then ¹L = ¹L¤(µ) is the value such that
¼0(¹L¤(µ); µ; s) = 1¡ cb
q
g(¹L¤(µ); µ; s)¡G(¹L¤(µ); µ; s) = 0
For ¹L¤(µ) to be a maximum, ¼00(¹L¤(µ); µ; s) must be less than zero. This is assured
by the assumption cbq gx(x; µ; s)+g(x; µ; s) > 0. The derivative of
¹L¤(µ) with respect
to µ can be calculated using the implicit function theorem
d¹L¤(µ)
dµ
= ¡
cb
q gµ(
¹L; µ; s) +Gµ(¹L; µ; s)
cb
q g¹L(
¹L; µ; s) + g(¹L; µ; s)
The assumption that ¹L¤(µ) does not change as µ changes holds as long as cbq gµ(¹L; µ; s)+
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Gµ(¹L; µ; s) = 0. This requires Gµ(¹L; µ; s) = ¡ cbq gµ(¹L; µ; s): The stochastic domi-
nance assumption implies Gµ(¹L; µ; s) ¸ 0; then gµ(¹L; µ; s) · 0:25
Proof of Proposition 2. It follows from di®erentiation of the expected return
function, when ¹L = ¹L¤ and for a given ¹D, that there is a maximum threshold
quality level µA.
Suppose that ¹L = ¹L¤, where ¹L¤ is the value that maximizes the bank's expected
revenue for a given µ. Di®erentiate the expected revenue function with respect to
µ, and observe that Gµ ¸ 0 by Second Order Stochastic Dominance. Then
¼(¹L¤; µ; s) = ¼L(¹L¤; µ; s)L0(µ) + ¼µ(¹L¤; µ; s)
Since ¹L¤ maximizes ¦(y; µ), the ¯rst term is zero. Therefore
¼µ(¹L
¤; µ; s) = ¡cb
q
Gµ(¹L; µ; s)¡
¹LZ
0
Gµ(y; µ; s) · 0
Then, the expected revenue function decreases as portfolio quality decreases. For
a given ¹D banks choose a quality threshold µA such that the expected revenue for
¹L¤ equals the opportunity cost of funds given by ¹D.
When ¹L < ¹L¤, for a given ¹D and a ¯xed quality threshold µ, the bank chooses
an interest rate on loans ¹L such that expected revenue equals the opportunity cost
given by ¹D: Any attempt to increase revenue would induce more depositors to
become banks, which would drive expected revenue down.
Table 8: The Multipliers
25The numerical example in Section 6 uses mean preserving changes in the variance as a
measure of the quality of the distribution of project returns, µ. In the example there is no
change in ¹L¤(µ) as µ changes. Other parameters can generate changes in either direction.
Ja®e and Stigtliz (1990) analyze a similar problem and note that as the expected return
function shifts down, the optimal loan rate can increase, decrease or stay the same. If the
success probability of a risky project is reduced by the same proportion as the reduction
in the success probability of the safe project, then the optimal loan rate does not change.
If the risky project's success probability is reduced by more than proportionally compared
with the safe project, then the loan rate will increase.
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Quantity Multiplier Ex. Quality Multiplier Ex.
du
d½ ¡ ®w(1¡
¹±)
¹x(1¡®)qH(µ) < 0 13:11 0 0
d ¹D
d½ ¡1 ¡1 0 0
d¹L
d½ ¡ ¡ 1¼¹L > 0 12:69
du
dq ¡[uq + ®w(1¡
¹±)
¹x(1¡®)qH(µ) ] < 0 ¡15:61 ¡ ¡
d ¹D
dq ¡½q < 0 ¡0:008 (1¡®)H(µ)¹x®w(1¡¹±) > 0 0:038
d¹L
dq ¡ ¡ 1¼¹L (
d ¹D
dq +
½
q ) 0:38
du
d¹x ¡ ®w
¹D(1¡¹±)
¹x(1¡®)qH(µ) < 0 ¡0:80 ¡ ¡
d ¹D
d¹x 0 0
¹D
¹x > 0 0:97
d¹L
d¹x ¡ ¡
¹D
¼¹L¹x
> 0 12:3
dµ
dcb
0 0 0 0
du
dcb
¼cb®w(1¡¹±)
¹x(1¡®)qH(µ) < 0 0:738 ¡ ¡
d ¹D
dcb
¼cb < 0 ¡0:056 0 0
d¹L
dcb
¡ ¡ ¡¼cb¼¹L > 0 0:714
du
dcd
¡ plq®w(1¡¹±)¹x(1¡®)qH(µ) < 0 ¡0:062 ¡ ¡
d ¹D
dcd
¡plq < 0 ¡0:02 0 0
d¹L
dcd
¡ ¡ plq¼¹L > 0 0:254
dspread
dpl
¡ 2:9 ¡ 20
9.3 Log Normal Distribution
Assume. The distribution of project returns is log normal.
² expected value ¹y = e¹+¾
2
2
² variance V ar[y] = e2(¹+¾2) ¡ e2¹+¾2
An increase in the variance, increases the mean return. We now show that the
model is robust to this speci¯cation of the return distribution.26 All parameters
are the same, except the mean return is ¹y = 0:35 (to make results comparable).
For µ = 0:92,27 the bank's expected return is maximized with a lower loan rate:
¹L = 0:126:
Credit Rationing by Loan Quality: u = 1
26Boyd and Smith (1997), (1998) use a uniform distribution in numerical examples.
27The index is based on the variance in the numerical calculations: ½ = 0:675 for
V ar[y] = 0:07.
35
Table 9: E®ect of Default Risk: cd = 0:6, q = 1:5
Variable No Default Default Risk
¹L 0:106 0:112
¹D 0:076 0:076
Spread 0:03 0:036
µ 0:92 0:92
u 1 1
pl 0 0:001
½ 0 0:009
Quality and Quantity Rationing: u < 1
Table 10: Increase in Default Risk: cd = 0:6, q = 1:5
pl 0 0:01 0:02 0:03 0:05 0:06 0:07
¹L 0:123 0:126 0:126 0:126 0:126 0:126 0:126
¹D 0:0777 0:0687 0:0597 0:0507 0:0327 0:0237 0:0147
Spread 0:0453 0:0573 0:0663 0:0753 0:0933 0:1023 0:1113
µ 0:92 0:92 0:92 0:92 0:92 0:92 0:92
u 1 0:90 0:78 0:66 0:42 0:31 0:19
½ 0 0:009 0:018 0:027 0:045 0:054 0:063
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